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HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS: A
HYPOCRITICAL APPROACH
Mark Gibney*
I. INTRODUCTION
1
Since the 1980 landmark decision in Filartigav. Pena-Irala,
U.S. courts have been asked to hear claims alleging the commission
of human rights violations occurring in other countries. In one group

of cases - suits by foreign plaintiffs against foreign state actors -- U.S.

domestic courts have provided a vital forum for individuals seeking
some measure of justice against those responsible for committing
heinous crimes. Yet, these same courts have given a much different
reception to foreign plaintiffs who allege that the U.S. government is
itself responsible for the commission of human rights abuses. In one
suit after another, foreigners who have been harmed by the pursuit of
U.S. foreign policy goals have had their claims dismissed by a panoply
of revolving defenses. If there is to be any relief and/or compensation
for the human consequences of U.S. foreign policy it is to come from
the political branches -- although there is only scant evidence of this
occurring. Finally, U.S. courts have shown some willingness to hear
human rights cases brought by American citizens, so long as these
suits do not implicate the U.S. government.
II. THE WILLINGNESS TO HEAR CLAIMS ALLEGING HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY OTHERS

At the time that it was decided, Filartigawas an audacious
and unprecedented lawsuit. Two Paraguayan nationals, Dr. Joel
Filartiga and his daughter Dolly, brought suit in a U.S. district court
for the alleged death by torture in Paraguay of Joelito Filartiga, son
and brother of the plaintiffs. According to the complaint, in 1976 the
defendant Pena-Irala, chief of police in Asuncion, Paraguay,

" Professor of Political Science, Purdue University
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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kidnapped Joelito and tortured him to death in retaliation for the
father's opposition to President Alfredo Stroessner's regime. The
family instituted criminal action against Pena-Irala in Paraguay but
these actions proved futile, resulting in the arrest and eventual
disbarment of the family's attorney.
By 1979 Dolly Filartiga was living permanently in New York
City. It was at that time that she learned that Pena-Irala was visiting
the U.S. Filartiga filed a civil suit in federal district court against
Pena-Irala on behalf of herself and her father, alleging subject matter
jurisdiction under, inter alia,the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),2 a
statute passed by the very first Congress, but essentially moribund
since that time. The District Court dismissed the complaint, but the
Court of Appeals reversed. In his opinion for the Second Circuit,
Judge Irving Kaufman held that the "law of nations" language in the
statute included evolving notions of international human rights law,
not simply what this term might have meant in 1789 when the statute
was passed. After reviewing the United Nations Charter, various
U.N. resolutions, and a host of international treaties and national
constitutions (including that of both Paraguay and the United States),
the Court held that under the law of nations, there was a "clear and
unambiguous" prohibition against official torture. On the basis of this
finding, the Court held that the ATCA provided federal jurisdiction
when "an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien
within our borders. 3 On remand, the District Court implemented the
Court of Appeals holding, awarding the Filartigas a default judgment
against Pena-Irala (who, by then, had returned to Paraguay) of more
than $10 million.'

228 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). In its current codification the statute reads: "The district
court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
' 630 F.2d at 878.
4 This judgment has never been satisfied. In fact, to date, this has been true of all
ATCA judgments. See generally Howard Tolley, Jr., InterestGroup Litigation to
Enforce Human Rights: ConfrontingJudicialRestraint, in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S.
COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGrrs (Mark Gibney ed., 1991).
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Filartigahas spawned a number of ATCA cases, nearly all of
which have been successful. In Forti v. Suarez-Mason,5 Argentine
citizens residing in the U.S. brought suit against a former Argentine
general for human rights violations that occurred under his command
during the "dirty war" in that country. While the Court found that it
had jurisdiction with respect to torture, prolonged arbitrary detention,
and summary execution, it initially dismissed the claims relating to
disappearances and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 6
Unfortunately, while this litigation was ongoing, the District Court
certified the extradition of General Suarez-Mason on charges of
murder, kidnapping, and forgery. 7 Suarez-Mason was then returned
to Argentina, although he never had to stand trial for his crimes and
was eventually pardoned!
Other successful ATCA cases include Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo,9
a case in which three Ethiopian women were awarded a judgment
against their former torturer, and Paul v. Avril, 0 where a federal
magistrate awarded a $41 million damage judgment to the victims of
Prosper Avril, a former Haitian dictator, for violating their human

' 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd in partandrev'd in part,694 F. Supp.
707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
6 Id The court subsequently granted a motion to reconsider with respect to causing
disappearances, but not with respect to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Forti
v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal 1988). The court held that "causing
disappearances" is wrong under customary international law, because of the general
recognition among states that this specific practice was prohibited. However, the
court held that "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" was not a violation of
customary international law because it was not definable. The court held that it could
not tell if the norm encompassed purely psychological harm, for example, or purely
verbal conduct.
7 Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
8 For a critique of the manner in which the case against General Suarez-Mason was
handled see Mark Gibney, InternationalHuman Rights as an InternationalConcern:
The Case of Argentine General Suarez-Mason and Lessons for the World
Community, 24 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 165 (1992).
' No. I:90-CV-2010-GET, 1993 WL 814304 (N.D. Ga., Aug. 20, 1993), affd, 72
F.3d 844 (1996).
10 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993), affd, 901 F. Supp. 330 (1994).
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rights. In Todd v. Panjaitan,n a federal judge in Massachusetts
awarded $14 million to Helen Todd, whose young son had been
murdered by Indonesian troops during a massacre in East Timor.
In re Marcos Human Rights Litigation12 was the first class
action suit brought under the ATCA, the first jury verdict, and finally,
the first case to be decided on the merits.13 The case consolidated five
separate civil suits filed in three different judicial districts, all alleging
various forms of human rights abuses under Ferdinand Marcos' reign.
All five cases were originally dismissed by the district courts in which
they were filed on the basis of the Act of State doctrine, but the Ninth
Circuit reversed in a brief and unpublished opinion, and at the same
time consolidated the cases for trial.
More recently, in 1995 a federal district court in
Massachusetts issued a $47.4 million judgment against the former
Defense Minister of Guatemala, Hector Gramajo, in a suit brought by
nine Guatemalans and a U.S. nun.14 The Guatemalan plaintiffs, all
Kanjobal Indians, had been brutalized by government soldiers under
Gramajo's command. Sister Diane Ortiz, an American nun who taught
school in Guatemala, had been abducted, raped, and otherwise
tortured by Guatemalan security and military forces. Because of her
U.S. citizenship, Ortiz could not sue under the ATCA. Instead, she
successfully brought suit against Gramajo under the Torture Victim
Protection Act,"5 which the Court applied retroactively. Finally, in
No. CIV. A. 92-12255-PBS, 1994 WL 827111 (D. Mass., Oct. 26, 1994).
12 MDL no. 840 (D. Haw. Sept. 24, 1992).
"

'3 For an excellent discussion of the case see Joan Fitzpatrick, The Future of the Alien
Ton Claims Act of 1789: Lessonsfioin In Re Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 67
ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 491 (1993).
" Xuncax v. Gramajo and Ortiz v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (1995).
1528 U.S.C. § 1350 (1996). The Act provides that:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or under color of
state law, of any foreign nation,
1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to that individual; or
2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative or to
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16 a default judgment was entered in
Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza,
favor of a group of Rwandan plaintiffs who had brought suit against
a leader of a Hutu political party which was behind the massacre of
Tutsi civilians in that country.
At the time of this writing, there are pending ATCA suits in
Belance v. FRAPH 7 and two companion cases, Doe v. Karadzic and
Kadac v. Karadzic.18 Belance is a suit brought by Alerte Belance, a
Haitian mother of three, against the Front for Advancement and
Progress in Haiti (FRAPH). In October 1993, four henchmen of this
para-military organization came to the Belance household in search of
the plaintiffs husband, a supporter of President Aristide. Not finding
him at home, they abducted his wife and took her to a "killing field"
where she was nearly decapitated and left for dead. Suit was filed in
the U.S. in 1994, seeking relief for attempted summary execution,
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, arbitrary detention, assault
and battery, and kidnapping. One of the more unique aspects of the
suit is that it is an attempt to hold an organization, rather than an
individual officer, responsible for human rights violations.
Karadzic involves a suit brought by two Muslim Serb women
who filed an ATCA claim in February 1993 against Radovan
Karadzic, the self-proclaimed leader of the Bosnian Serbs. The central
focus of the case is the use of organized mass rape by Serb forces in
Bosnia as a means of carrying out the Serb goal of"ethnic cleansing."
The District Court dismissed the suit on the ground that international
law cannot be applied against an "unrecognized" government such as
the Bosnian Serbs. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed this
decision holding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged violations
of customary international law and law of war for purposes of the

any pursuant who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.
Id. Unlike the ATCA, the TVPA is not limited to claims by foreign plaintiffs, so
that actions can be brought by U.S. citizens as well.
16 No. 94-3627, 1996 WL 164496 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996).
17No. 94-2619 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 1, 1994).
"B866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd andrem 'd,70 F.3d 232 (1995), reh 'g
denied,74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996), cert denied, 135 L.Ed. 2d 1048 (1996).
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ATCA, and that the judicial action was not precluded by the political
question doctrine.
Not all ATCA claims have been successful, the most notable
being Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.9 Tel-Oren involved a 1978
terrorist incident on the coast in Israel. Thirteen members of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) landed a boat in Israel and
hijacked a bus. In a confrontation with Israeli police, the members of
the PLO shot at their hostages and blew up the bus, killing thirty-four
adults and children and wounding seventy-five others. Survivors of
the attack filed suit in the district court of the District of Columbia,
basing jurisdiction on the ATCA. The plaintiffs included Israeli,
Dutch and American citizens.
Affirming the District Court's dismissal of the case, the panel
for the Second Circuit deciding the case issued a one page per curiam
opinion, accompanied by lengthy concurring opinions from each of the
three judges. Judge Edwards' opinion came the closest to the
reasoning in Filartiga.Edwards was of the opinion that the ATCA
did provide a cause of action for aliens asserting violations of the law
of nations. However, Edwards based dismissal on the fact that, while
the law of nations prohibits torture by state actors and persons acting
under color of state law, the PLO (as a non-state actor) was not
subject to the same rules of international law. Judge Bork's opinion
for dismissal was based on several factors. One was that such a suit
would violate separation of powers principles. Bork also took the
position that while the ATCA granted jurisdiction, it did not also
create a cause of action for an individual alien. Finally, Bork would
restrict violations of the "law of nations" in the statutory language to
those that were recognized as international crimes in 1789: violation
of safe-conduct, infringement on ambassadorial rights, and piracy.
Judge Robb voted to affirm dismissal on the basis that the case
presented a nonjusticiable political question. In his view, federal
courts were not able to determine the legal status of international

"' 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
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terrorism, nor trace individual responsibility for any particular act of
terrorism. Robb also feared that there was no logical stopping place
for such lawsuits.
We are here confronted with the easiest case and thus
the most difficult to resist. It was a similar magnet
that drew the Second Circuit into its unfortunate
position inFilartiga.But not all cases of this type will
be so easy. Indeed, most would be far less attractive.
The victims of international violence perpetrated by
terrorism are spread across the globe. It is not
implausible that every alleged victim of violence of the
counter-revolutionaries in such places as Nicaragua
and Afghanistan could argue just as compellingly as
the plaintiffs here do, they are entitled to their day in
the courts of the United States. The victims of the
recent massacres in Lebanon could also mount such
claims. Indeed, there is no obvious or subtle limiting
principle in sight.2"
Suits directly against foreign sovereigns have also been
unsuccessful, although there was some initial promise. In Von Dardel
v. U.S.S.R.,21 suit was brought in the district court for the District of
Columbia by the half-brother and legal guardian of the Swedish
diplomat Raoul Wallenberg against the Soviet Union, concerning the
unlawful seizure of Wallenberg in 1945 and his subsequent
imprisonment and possible death while under Soviet custody. The
Court initially held that the ATCA provided jurisdiction and granted
a default judgment when the U.S.S.R. refused to defend the case.
However, when the Soviets made a limited appearance to contest
jurisdiction, the District Court granted a motion to vacate the
judgment for lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign
20
2'

726 F.2d at 826 (citations omitted).
623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985), vacatedand dismissed, Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R.,

736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990).
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Immunity Act (FSIA).'
The most noteworthy development in this area occurred in
Siderman v. Republic of Argentina.3 Siderman was a torture victim
who also had property confiscated in Argentina. Even after fleeing his
home country Siderman's nightmare did not end, as Argentine
authorities sought to have him arrested for fraud while he was residing
in Italy and the U. S. In 1982, Jose Siderman and his family brought
suit in federal district court. The Court first entered a default
judgment for the plaintiff, but subsequently reversed and dismissed on
the ground that there was no explicit exception in the FSIA for
allegations of human rights violations. The Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded the case. With respect to the expropriation claim, the
Court held that the Siderman's had alleged sufficient evidence to bring
the claim within both the commercial activity and international takings
exceptions to the FSIA's grant of foreign sovereign immunity. 4 With
regard to the torture claim, the Court held that the FSIA does not
specifically provide for an exception to sovereign immunity based on
jus cogens.5 However, the Court held that by pursuing Siderman in
this country, the Republic of Argentina might have waived its
sovereign immunity for purposes of the FSIA. It then remanded the
case to allow Argentina to rebut this evidence; however, in September
1996, Siderman reached an out of court settlement with the Argentine
government.26

28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1993). This statute immunizes any "political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," unless
certain exceptions apply. These are: 1) an express or implied waiver, 2) involvement
in commercial activities, 3) taking of property that is currently present in the U.S., 4)
acquisition of a gift by succession of property that is currently present in the U.S., 5)
commission of noncommercial torts inside the U.S., and 6) involvement in certain
maritime activities.
23 No. CV 82-1772-RMT (C.D. Cal. March 12, 1984) vacated,No. CV 82-1772RMT (C.D. Cal. March 7, 1985), reversed, 965 F. 2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
24 965 F.2d at 712.
25 Id. at718.
26 Tim Golden, Argentina Settles Lawsuit By a Victim of Torture, NY TLwEs, Sept.
22

14, 1996, at A6.
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In sum, despite some limitations, U.S. courts have played a
very unique role in the world in terms of providing a forum for those
who have been victims of human rights abuses. It is remarkable to
think that it was only slightly more than a decade and a half ago that
the prospects of bringing to trial torturers and murderers from
Paraguay or Ethiopia or Indonesia or Guatemala or Haiti or anywhere
else seemed completely out of the realm of the possibility. Much has
changed in a relatively short period of time. The U.S. has now opened
its courts to those who have suffered human rights abuses at the hands
of foreign state actors, so long as personal jurisdiction can be obtained
over the defendant. As we will see in the next section, however, these
same courts have not been nearly so willing to hear allegations of
human rights abuses that implicate the U.S.

III. ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE UNITED
STATES

Perhaps emboldened by the success of foreign plaintiffs in
Filartigatype cases, U.S. courts have also been asked to hear cases
where the alleged perpetrator of human rights violations is the U.S.
government itself In Sanchez-Espinozav. Reagan,27 three groups of
plaintiffs challenged the human consequences of U.S. policy in
Nicaragua. 2 For present purposes, the most noteworthy group

27

568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 770 F. 2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

The complaint and supporting briefs filed by the plaintiffs provided very graphic
detail of their alleged suffering. The plaintiff-appellant brief reads in part:
Twelve of the plaintiffs or their close family members have been
subjected to murder, torture, mutilation, kidnapping and rape as a
result of U.S.-sponsored paramilitary activities designed to ravage
the civilian population in Nicaragua....

The facts of the injuries to each of the plaintiffs or their family
members reflect brutal, inhumane activities violative of
fundamental laws of civilized nations. For example, plaintiff Maria
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consisted of twelve Nicaraguan civilians29 who were suing nine then
present or former officials of the Executive branch including President

Reagan,30 three non-federal defendants, and a group of unidentified
officers or agents of the U.S. The basis of the suit was the allegation
that the U.S. government was providing support to the contra rebel
forces who were committing terrorist raids in Nicaragua, in violation
of fundamental human rights established under international law and
the fourth and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution.
These non-resident alien plaintiffs sought monetary damages, as well

Bustillo de Blandon, a resident of Nicaragua, saw her husband and
five sons murdered and tortured by members of the Nicaraguan
Democratic Front (FDN) -- the main counterrevolutionary group
funded by the federal defendants. On October 28, 1982, the
contras entered her home, seized her husband, a lay pastor, and
removed their five children from their beds. In front of the parents,
the children were tied together, castrated, their ears cut off and their
throats slit. The father was then killed.
Brief for Appellants at 7-8, Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F. 2d 202 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (No. 83-1997) (citations omitted) (on file with author).
" The other two groups of plaintiffs were twelve members of the U.S. House of
Representatives who claimed that the Executive branch violated Congress' ability to
declare war, as well as provisions of the War Powers Resolution. In addition, the
congressional plaintiffs claimed that the activities of the Executive branch violated the
so-called Boland Amendment, which had prohibited further funding for the contra
rebel forces. The other group of plaintiffs were Florida residents who charged that the
U.S. sponsored paramilitary training camps in that state constituted a public nuisance.
Id. at 3-4.
' Ronald Wilson Reagan, individually and in his official capacity as President of the
United States; William Casey, individually and in his official capacity as Director of
Central Intelligence; Alexander M. Haig, Jr.; George P. Schultz, individually and in
his official capacity as United States Secretary of State; Thomas 0. Enders,
individually, Vemon Walters, individually and in his official capacity as United States
Ambassador-at-Large; Caspar Weinberger, individually and in his official capacity as
United States Secretary of Defense; Nestor Sanchez, individually and in his official
capacity as United States Assistant Secretary of Defense; John D. Negroponte,
individually and in his official capacity as United States Ambassador to Honduras.
First Amended Complaint for Damages, Declaratory and Injuctive Relief at 8-9,
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202.
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as declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting further U.S. military
involvement in Nicaragua.
Despite recognizing the "gravity and legal complexity of the
plaintiffs' claims, 3 1 the District Court dismissed the suit on the basis
ofthe political question doctrine, holding that: "In order to adjudicate
the tort claims of the Nicaraguan plaintiffs, we would have to
determine the precise nature of the United States Government's
involvement in the affairs of several Central American nations,
namely,
'3 2
"
Nicaragua.
and
Salvador,
El
Honduras, Costa Rica,
The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, but on the basis
of sovereign immunity rather than the political question doctrine.
Responding to the civilians' claim for monetary damages, then Judge
Scalia writes:
It would make a mockery of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity if federal courts were authorized to sanction
or enjoin, by judgments nominally against present or
former Executive officers, actions that are concededly
and as ajurisdictional necessity, official actions of the
United States. Such judgments would necessarily
interfere with the public administration, or restrain the
government from acting, or... compel it to act.... 33
In terms of the claim for injunctive relief, the Court held:
The support for military operations that we are asked
to terminate has, ifthe allegations in the complaint are
accepted as true, received the attention and approval
of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of'Defense, and the Director of the CIA, and involves
the conduct of our diplomatic relations with at least
four sovereign states -- Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
3, 568 F. Supp. at 601.
32

Id.

31 770 F. 2d at 207 (citations and emphasis omitted).
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Honduras, and Argentina. Whether or not this is, as
the District Court thought, a matter so entirely
committed to the care of the political branches as to
preclude our considering the issue at all, we think it at
least requires the withholding of discretionary relief 34
Ironically enough, Scalia's opinion in Sanchez-Espinoza took
35 Also
special pains to distinguish itself from Filartigav. Pena-Irala.
noteworthy is the fact that the Court failed to make reference to a case
from the same circuit that had been decided only a year before,
Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger.36 In this case, an American
citizen living in Honduras brought suit claiming that the U.S.
government had unlawfully seized and destroyed his property in
Honduras, turning his meat packing plant into a military training post.
The District Court dismissed the case on the basis of the political
question doctrine, 37 but the Court of Appeals reversed in an en banc
decision. In sharp contrast to the decision a year later in SanchezEspinoza, the Court held that the plaintiff was not attempting to have

31 Id. at 208.
31 Scalia writes:

Since the doctrine of foreign immunity is quite distinct from the
doctrine of domestic sovereign immunity that we apply here, being
based upon considerations of international comity, rather than
separation of powers, it does not necessarily follow that an Alien
Tort Statute suit filed against the officer of a foreign sovereign
would have to be dismissed. Thus, nothing in today's decision
necessarily conflicts with the decision of the Second Circuit in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.
Id. at 207 n.5 (citations omitted).
36

568 F. Supp. 1236 (D.D.C. 1983) rev'd, 745 F. 2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en

bane), vacated andrem'd,Weinberger v. Ramirez, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985) (remanded
in light of the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act, 1985, and efforts
by Honduras to make restitution) rev'd, 788 F. 2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (withdrawal
of all U.S. personnel fundamentally altered the balance of equities).
" 568 F. Supp. 1236 (D.D.C. 1983).
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the judicial branch monitor the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in
Central America, nor did the legal claim challenge the U.S.'s relations
with any foreign country. Instead, the Court in Ramirez held: "The
Executive's power to conduct foreign relations free from unwarranted
supervision of the Judiciary cannot give the Executive carte blanche
to trample the most fundamental liberty and property rights of this
country's citizenry."3" The Court continues:
The suggestion [by the defendant] that a United States
citizen who is the sole beneficial owner of viable
business operations does not have constitutional rights
against United States government officials' threatened
complete destruction of corporate assets is
preposterous. If adopted by this court, the proposition
would obliterate the constitutional property rights of
many United States citizens abroad and would make a
mockery of decades of United States policy on
transnational investments.39
Would a Honduran national in the same situation as Ramirez
have the same kind of claim against the U.S. government? That
appears very unlikely, although it is not exactly clear why this would
be. The same issue arises as to what it is, exactly, that differentiates
Filartigafrom Sanchez-Espinoza. Scalia attempted to distinguish the
two cases on the basis of domestic versus foreign sovereign
immunity,40but that is a distinction without a difference. David Cole
has argued that the only way to explain Sanchez-Espinoza is to
understand the enormous reluctance of U.S. courts to address
accusations of wrongdoing by the U.S. government.
Sanchez-Espinoza asks the federal courts to apply the
same international human rights norm -- the
3 745 F.2d at 1515.

3 Id.
at 1515-16.
40

Sanchez-Espinoza 770 F2d. 202, 207 n. 1; see supra accompanying note 35.
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proscription against official torture -- to officials of the
United States government. Like Filartiga,SanchezEspinoza raises fundamental questions about the role
of domestic courts in enforcing customary norms of
international law. On the one hand, Sanchez-Espinoza
is an easier case than Filartiga;plaintiffs do not ask
United States courts to reach out to the domestic
affairs of a foreign state.4"
Cole continues:
On the other hand, Sanchez-Espinoza is a more
difficult case than Filartiga;it asks the United States
judiciary to interpose the norms of international law
between itself and a coequal branch of the
government, and to impose limits on the executive that
derive only indirectly from the constitutional mandate.
As a purely pragmatic matter, it seems it is much
easier to award $10.4 million in damages to Filartiga
against a judgment-proof ex-police chief from
Paraguay than to enjoin the military activities of the
President of the United States. As a matter of law,
however, it is less easily defensible for federal courts
to take jurisdiction in Filartiga and refuse it in
42
Sanchez-Espinoza.
Notwithstanding the decision in Sanchez-Espinoza, other suits
alleging human rights abuses by the U.S. government have been
brought, in each instance with the same result. Saltany v. Reagan43
involved a suit brought by a group of 55 plaintiffs, all residents of
Libya, whose decedents (all civilians) were either killed, suffered
David Cole, ChallengingCovert War: The Politics of the PoliticalQuestion
Doctrine, 26 HARv. INT'LL. J. 155,163 (1985).
42 Id.
4' 702 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1988).
'
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personal injury, or whose property was damaged or destroyed during
the course ofU.S. military air strikes on that country in April 1986, in
retaliation for the bombing of a disco in West Berlin on April 5, 1986
that resulted in the deaths of two U.S. servicemen. The defendants
were the President of the U.S., various civilian and military officials
of the U.S. government, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the
United Kingdom, and the U.S. and United Kingdom governments.
The District Court dismissed the case in a summary fashion.
The claim against the United Kingdom was dismissed on the basis of
the Act of State doctrine and those relating to the U.S. defendants on
the basis of sovereign immunity, although the Court readily conceded
that the alleged conduct would be "tortious" were it to be judged by
any civil law standards." For reasons left mostly unexplained,
however, the bombing and killing of innocent civilians were never
judged by such standards. Indeed, they were not judged by any
standards at all. Rather, the Court made reference to the fact that the
defendants had exercised "discretion in a myriad of contexts of utmost
complexity and gravity, not to mention danger. And each acted, as
duty required, in accordance with the orders of the commander-inchief or a superior order."45 Somehow from the fact that orders were
being followed, the Court proceeded to hold that the defendants
enjoyed immunity from suit.
Notwithstanding the death and harm to innocent civilians from
this aerial attack, and despite the absence of hostilities between Libya
and the U.S., what was galling to the Court was that suit was ever
brought in the first place.
The plaintiffs, purportedly citizens or residents of
Libya, cannot be presumed to be familiar with the rules
of law of the United States. It is otherwise, however,
with their counsel [former U.S. Attorney General
Ramsey Clark]. The case offered no hope whatsoever

4 Id. at 322.
45 Id.
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of success, and plaintiffs' attorneys surely knew it."
The Court continues:
The injuries for which suit is brought are not
insubstantial. It cannot, therefore, be said that the
case is frivolous so much as it is audacious. The Court
surmises it was brought as a public statement of
protest of Presidential action with which counsel (and,
to be sure, their clients) were in profound
disagreement47
Despite the perceived "audaciousness" of the suit, the Court
refused to apply sanctions against the plaintiffs' attorneys. On appeal,
the Court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim, but reversed the
denial of Rule 11 sanctions48 with regard to the United Kingdom.49 In
the Court's view, federal courts are not to serve as a forum for
protests to the detriment of parties with serious disputes waiting to be
heard. In its haste to pass judgment against those bringing the lawsuit,
however, the Court ignored a number of factors. One is that there
was (and continues to be) serious dispute whether the military action
against Libya was warranted in the sense that both the West Berlin
police and the Federal Republic of Germany publicly disputed whether
Libyan agents were involved in the incident, with evidence implicating
Syria instead. Second, even if Libyan agents were somehow involved
in the disco bombing, the air raids conducted in retaliation violated the
laws of war. Article 25 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 states:
"The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages,

46

Id.

47Id.
4 FED. R. CIv. P. 1I.

Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F. 2d 438 (1989).
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dwellings, or buildings which are undefended, is prohibited.""
Unfortunately neither ofthese two arguments was given much
weight by the Court. Nor were the courts apparently moved to action
either by the loss of innocent civilian life, or the complete lack of any
compensation for the plaintiffs. Instead, not only were these harms
viewed as mere abstractions, but they somehow became justified in the
name of U.S. national security."1
The pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Persian
Gulf gave rise to a slightly different kind of claim in Nejad v. United
States.52 The action arose out of the downing of Iran Air Flight 655
over the Persian Gulf by missile fire from the USS Vincennes, killing
all of the passengers and crew aboard. The commercial airliner had
been mistaken for a military aircraft, and was mistakenly fired upon
for that reason. Plaintiffs in the case were the families and economic
dependents of four of the passengers. The defendants were the U.S.
and twelve defense contractors who supplied the ship with various
military equipment. The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' case,
evincing the usual deference to the political branches.
"[I]t is indubitably clear that plaintiffs' claim calls into question
the Navy's decisions and actions in execution of those decisions. The
conduct of such affairs are constitutionally committed to the President

' Annex to the Convention, Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Art. 25, Convention (No. IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, TS No. 539, 205 Parry's TS 277.
"' Consider a different situation: the U.S. bombing of Baghdad in June 1993 in
retaliation for an alleged assassination plot against former President Bush while he
was visiting Kuwait earlier that year. Although Iraqi suspects were under the control
of Kuwaiti officials, the U. S. launched 23 Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from
warships in the Persian Gulf, with 16 of these hitting their intended targets. It is
estimated that more than 20 civilians were killed from the missile attack, for which the
U. S. expressed "regret," but offered no form of compensation. Eric Schmitt, U.S.
Says Strike CrippledIraq'sCapacityfor Terror: 16 of 23 Missiles Are Saidto Hit
the Targets, N.Y. TnMEs, June 28, 1993, at Al; Six Arabs Deny Role in Any Plot to
Kill Bush, N.Y. TIMEs, July 4, 1993, at 11; Tim Weiner, Plot by Baghdad to
Assassinate Bush Is Questioned, N.Y. TMEs, Oct. 25, 1993, at A5.
", 724 F. Supp. 753 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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as Commander in Chief and to his military and naval subordinates."53
Quite recently, the U.S. government has made ex gratiapayments54
to the families of those killed in the Vincennes incident, agreeing to
pay $300,000 to each of the wage-earning victims and $150,000 to
each non wage-earning victims.5"
The U.S. invasion of Panama, and the resulting harm caused
thereby, has also given rise to litigation in this country.56 In
McFarlandv. Cheney,57 suit was brought on behalf of a group of
Panamanian civilians who suffered personal injury, property loss, and
death of loved ones during the American invasion that began on
December 20, 1989. Estimates of the number of civilians killed range
from 200 to ten times that number. Many of the petitioners in the
case filed administrative service claims with the U.S. Army Claims
Service seeking compensation for their losses and injuries. Although
civilians injured during the course of the U.S. invasion of Grenada in
1983 had been compensated in this fashion,58 the Army Claims Service

53 Id. at 755.

SU.S. to Pay 248 IraniansWho Lost Kin to Missile, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1996, at
A4.
" In another air accident case in the Middle East, the U. S. has decided to pay
$ 100,000 to each of the families of eleven foreign citizens killed in the accidental
downing of two Army helicopters by two American fighter jets over northern Iraq in
April 1994. This action, however, prompted some public outcry and congressional
attention because the families of at least four of the American victims of this accident
are demanding the same lump sum payment as that provided the families of the
British, French, Turkish and Kurdish citizens who died. Eric Schmitt, Payment in
CopterDowningin Iraq BringsBitter Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at A 10.
56 Several lawsuits have been brought by Panamanian corporations. See, e.g.,
Industria Panificadora, S.A. v. U.S., 763 F. Supp. 1154 (D.D.C. 1991) involved a suit
alleging that as a result of the U.S. invasion, the plaintiff's property was looted,
burned, and destroyed while the Panamanian Defense Force was engaged militarily
with the U. S. Armed Forces. The Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss,
holding that the decision to invade Panama was an exercise of governmental
discretion.
57 1991 WL43262 (D.D.C. 1991), affd971 F. 2d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied
506 U. S. 1053 (1993).
' Jefiey Harris, Grenada-- A Claims Perspective,THE ARMY LAWYER, Jan. 1986,
at 7.
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rejected all of the Panamanian compensation claims on the grounds
that injury occurred during U.S. combat operations.59 The District
Court upheld this administrative finding, and this judgment was
affirmed on appeal.' While Panama has received emergency assistance
from the U.S. since the invasion, no funds have
been set aside for the
61
relief of the innocent victims of the combat.
In sum, while U.S. courts have provided a welcome forum for
aliefis suing foreign state actors for the commission of human rights
abuses in other countries, these same courts have not been willing to
hear similar claims brought by foreign plaintiffs who are alleging that
the U.S. government is responsible for committing human rights
abuses.62 Instead, such suits are viewed as invitations to violate
separation of power principles. The problem is that courts grossly
exaggerate the role they say they are being asked to play -- in one case
after another the judge would have you believe that compensating
innocent victims would be akin to the courts directing U.S. foreign
policy - that what gets completely lost is the nature of the individual
claim that is being presented. In a very cavalier manner, then Judge
Scalia in Sanchez-Espinoza suggests that if foreign plaintiffs are to

One of the ironies is that in a case brought before the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights against the U. S. for exactly the same kind of harms as alleged in
McFarland, Salas v. United States, 1993 INTIR-AM. Y.B. ON H.R. (Inter-Am. C.H.R.)
476, among the defenses erected by the U.S. government was that the petitioners had
not filed a claim with the Army Claims Service. The OAS Commission rejected these
defenses, and held that it would hear the merits of the claim. Evidentiary hearings
were held in 1995 and a final decision of the OAS commission is pending.
60 971 F. 2d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
61 Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-302, 104 Stat.
213 (1990).
62 A different claim, but with the same predictable result, was presented in Antolok
v. United States, 873 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs in this case were a group
of former and current residents of the Marshall Islands suing for harm to them from
American nuclear testing in the Pacific. The district court had dismissed the case on
the basis of the political question doctrine, and this decision was upheld by the appeals
court, but mainly on the basis that Congress had removed jurisdiction from federal
courts to hear such cases when it signed a Compact with the government of the
Marshall Islands.
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receive any relief for the harm done to them from the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy, this must come from the political branches, not from
the courts. 63 But this answer is anathema to our entire system of
government. What is so radical -- and completely unacceptable -about such a position is that it is essentially saying that when the U.S.
government is pursuing activities in other countries (and apparently
this would include "domestic" operations such as the drug warn), it
is not only not bound by our own laws or by the Constitution, but that
our entire structure of checks and balances is somehow irrelevant. As
Thomas Franck has warned; "Judicial deference ignores the evident
truth that in our system a law that is not enforceable by adjudicatory
processes is no law at all. A foreign policy exempt from judicial
review is tantamount to governance by men and women emancipated
from the bonds of law." 65
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS SuITs BROUGHT BY UNITED STATES CITIZENS

The plaintiffs in Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaraguav.
were individual U.S. citizens and organizations representing
the same who lived and worked in Nicaragua during the civil war
there. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the U.S.

Reagans

' Whether or not the present litigation is motivated by considerations of geopolitics
rather than personal harm, we think that as a general matter the danger of foreign
citizens' (sic) using the courts in situations such as this to obstruct the foreign policy
of our government is sufficiently acute that we must leave to Congress the judgment
whether a damage remedy should exist. 770 F. 2d at 209.
' In a very perceptive piece OurMen in Guadalajaraand the Abduction of Suspects
Abroad: A Comment on UnitedStates v. Alvarez-Machain, John Quigley argues that
our courts have been completely incapable of recognizing human rights abuses (such
as kidnapping and abductions) committed by agents of the federal government in
waging the war on drugs. John Quigley, OurMen in Guadalajaraand the Abduction
of Suspects Abroad: A Comment on UnitedStates v. Alvarez-Machain, 68 NoTRE

DAME L. REv. 723 (1993).

'

THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLmc~A QuEsTION/JuDlciAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE
8 (1992).

OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS?

66 Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859

1988).

F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.
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government's support for the contra rebel forces was in violation of
international law and the U.S. Constitution. In terms of the former,
the plaintiffs relied on the judgment of the International Court of
Justice in Nicaraguav. UnitedStates6' which determined that the U.S.
had violated international law and thereby "[i]s under a duty to
immediately cease and refrain from all acts as may constitute breaches
'
Among the acts in violation of
of the foregoing obligations."68
international law were the "[t]raining, arming, equipping, financing
and supplying [of] the [C]ontra forces."69
The plaintiffs' constitutional claim alleged that the U.S.
government trained and supported the Contras who, in turn, detained,
threatened and deprived plaintiffs of their liberty. Part of the claim of
physical harm and the threat of harm rested on a generalized fear of
the recurring violence in Nicaragua; but in addition, the plaintiffs also
alleged that the Contra leaders had specifically targeted U.S. citizens
living in that country as "internationalists" and as "enemy targets."
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the basis of the
political question doctrine. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, but took special measures to base its holding on other
grounds: "We believe the trial court's reliance on the political
question doctrine was misplaced, particularly to the extent that
appellants seek to vindicate personal rights rather than conform
America's foreign policy to international norms."7 Despite the Court's
recognition of the seriousness of the plaintiffs' claims and the fact that
they were presenting personal (rather than political) rights, the Court
affirmed dismissal on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. With regard to the international
law claim, the Court held that the ICJ ruling was without domestic
effect. With regard to violations of international law more generally,
the Court held that only if the President and the Congress had violated
a peremptory norm of international law, might there be some domestic
67

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicargua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, at 14.
859 F. 2d at 932, quoting 1986 I.C.J. 14, 149.

69 Id.
70

Id.
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challenge to that policy.7"
The plaintiffs' constitutional claim was based on a fifth
amendment argument that the U.S. government was providing
assistance to the Contras, who were in turn depriving the plaintiffs of
their life, liberty, and property without due process of law. Although
the Court seemed concerned by the seriousness of this claim, it
ultimately held that the link between the U.S. and the Contras was not
strong enough to impute the actions of the latter to the former.
Appellants must demonstrate . . . that the United
States' involvement in this targeting of Americans in
Nicaragua is sufficient to constitute a due process
violation by our government.
Appellants' fifth
amendment claim founders on this requirement; their
complaint does not allege that the United States has
participated in any way in the targeting or injuries
against Americans or their property in Nicaragua. Nor
do they allege that such injuries are intended
consequences of our government's support for the
Contras.7"
The claim of another American citizen also arising out of
events in Nicaragua has received a somewhat different reception.
73 involves a suit brought in federal
Linder v. Calero Portocarrero
court for the death of Benjamin Linder, an American mechanical
71Describing

72
"

the domestic effects ofjus cogens norms, the Court holds:

Such basic norms of international law as the proscription against
murder and slavery may well have the domestic legal effect that
appellants suggest. That is, they may well restrain our government
in the same way that the Constitution restrains it. If Congress
adopted a foreign policy that resulted in the enslavement of our
citizens or other individuals, that policy might well be subject to
challenge in domestic court under international law. Id. at 94 1.
Id. at 945 (emphasis in original).
747 F. Supp. 1452 (S.D. Fla 1990), affdandrev'd,963 F. 2d 332 (1992).
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engineer who moved to Nicaragua in August 1983. In the complaint
it is alleged that while building a hydroelectric plant in the El Cua
region, the group that Linder was with was ambushed by a Nicaraguan
Democratic Force (WDN) patrol. Linder was immobilized by wounds
to his legs and arm. These wounds would not have caused Linder's
death, but members of the FDN then proceeded to torture him by
inflicting thirty to forty wounds to his face with a sharp pointed
object. Subsequently, Linder was killed by one of the Contras, who
shot him in the temple from a distance of less than two feet. The
defendants were three Contra organizations and four individuals. The
basis of the plaintiffs claim was that the Contra rebels targeted Linder
as a U.S. citizen, and that some of the activities in furtherance of this
terrorist plan took place in the Southern District of Florida, in
violation of state law.
The District Court dismissed the case on the basis of the
political question doctrine.
In our view, the court is without discoverable and
manageable standards to adjudicate the nature and
methods by which the contras chose to wage war in
Nicaragua. The realm of issues determinable by a
court or jury with reference to Florida tort law simply
does not include issues such as these arising out of
conflict between belligerents in the midst of a foreign
civil war.74
The Court continues:
Among other things, we would be required to discern
between military, quasi-military, industrial, economic
and other strategic targets, and rule upon the
legitimacy of targeting such sites as hydroelectric
plants on Nicaraguan soil in the course of a civil war.

' 747 F. Supp. at 1460.
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We would be called upon to inquire into whether and
under what circumstances Defendants were justified in
targeting such sites with knowledge that civilians, or
paramilitary or military personnel would be present at
the sites. Indeed we would be called upon to discern
between military or paramilitary personnel guarding a
strategic dam and engineers building or maintaining
such a site during time of war. In short, we would
necessarily be required to measure and carefully assess
the use of the tools of violence and warfare in the
midst of a foreign civil war. Nothing in Florida's law
of torts adequately prepares us for so daunting an
undertaking.75
The Court buttressed the grounds for dismissal by pointing to
information gathering problems inherent in such a suit.76 Finally,
although the plaintiffs claim was solely against several Nicaraguan
defendants, the Court was of the opinion that such a suit would
ultimately serve to interfere with the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
In sharp contrast to Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaraguawhere
it was held that the actions of the Contras could not be imputed to the
U. S. government," the District Court in Linder perceived an almost
inextricable link.
The adjudication of the merits of these claims
manifestly would require inquiry into the full scope of
Defendants' modus operandi for carrying out warfare
in Nicaragua. The Court would be required to make
determinations regarding: the identity of those
Id.
For example, at one point in its opinion the Court held that: "The defendants are
unlikely to readily testify concerning the confidential information channels of their
organization." Id. at 1466. This, however, would be true of nearly any and all
defendants appearing in court.
77 859 F.2d at 945.
75

76
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responsible for the creation and execution of contra
military strategy; the precise nature and scope of the
strategy employed by the contras; the physical location
where the contras' decision-making procedures
occurred; and the time during which strategy was
formulated. Because of the intimate link between the
contras' activities and the political branches' policy
toward Nicaragua, an inquiry into the parameters of
contra policy would surely involve efforts to uncover
the nature of the relationship between United States
policy and the actions of the contras.78
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court's dismissal.79 While agreeing with the lower court that the
plaintiffs claim essentially raised a host of non-justiciable political
questions, the Appellate Court also was of the view that there was no
civil war exception to the right to sue for tortious conduct that
violates the fundamental norms of the customary laws of war.8" As a
consequence, the Court reversed and remanded on the issue of
whether Linder's murder had been planned in southern Florida. The
case is pending at the present time.
V. FuTuRE DIRECTIONS
Will U.S. courts continue to hear cases involving violations of
human rights? In all likelihood many of the trends described in this
article will continue. The law governing ATCA cases is now fairly
well established, at least with regard to individual state actors.
Whether plaintiffs will begin to collect on the judgments they have
been awarded - which has not happened to date -- is still problematic,
although there may be cases (such as the Marcos litigation) where
other governments will cooperate. Efforts to bring human rights
78 747 F. Supp. at 1469.

7 Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F. 2d 332 (11 th Cir. 1992).
8 Id. at 336.
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violators to justice will undoubtedly be buttressed by the Torture
Victim Protection Act, as the litigation involving Sister Ortiz would
indicate."1
As this article has shown, however, U.S. courts have
attempted to make a sharp distinction between human rights abuses
committed by others (which, in most instances, will be litigated) and
allegations of human rights abuses by the U.S. government (which will
not be). There are at least two problems with this. The first has been
alluded to before: the hypocrisy of addressing human rights violations
committed by others, but not those committed by the U.S. T h e
second problem is that it is not always clear which transgressions are
ours, and which are those of others. Consider the Ortiz case.82 Sister
Ortiz's TVPA suit, which accompanied an ATCA suit, was brought
against Guatemalan General Hector Gramajo. However, there is now
fairly clear evidence that Gramajo was on the payroll of the CIA,83 and
that American officials knew of (and quite possibly directed) Ortiz's
torture. Is Gramajo a foreign state actor, a U.S. state actor -- or
both? The same phenomena has occurred in another ATCA case,
Belance v. FRAPH,84 now that it has been revealed that Emmanual
"Toto" Constant, the leader of FRAPH, was himself a CIA agent.
Again, how does one separate the actions of the United States from
those on its payroll? Certainly in the domestic sphere no such
distinction could be maintained.
There are, of course, other examples where the actions of
foreign actors blend together with those of the U.S. Guatemala
presents several such situations. For example, there is evidence
implicating Col. Julio Roberto Alpirez, a Guatemalan intelligence
officer, in the killing of Michael DeVine, a U.S. citizen living in
Guatemala. Alpirez, like Gramajo (and much of the Guatemalan
"I Xuncax V. Gramajo and Ortiz v. Gramajo; see supra accompanying note 14 and
text.
2 Id.
' Allan Naim, C.IA. Death Squads, THE NATION, April 7, 1995; Murder as Policy,
THE NATION, April 24, 1995; The County Team, THE NATION, June 5, 1995.
' Belance v. FRAPH; see supra accompanying note 17.
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military and civilian leadership, it seems), was a paid agent of the
CIA.85 If the decedents of DeVine were to bring a wrongful death
suit, against whom would the cause of action lie? Against the
Guatemalan government? Certainly. Against the U.S. government,
or particular agents of the U.S. government? It seems difficult to
imagine why not - shouldn't the actions of Alpirez be imputed to both
of his employers?
Or consider the torture and murder of Efrain Bamaca
Velasquez, a guerilla leader who was married to Jennifer Harbury, a
U.S. citizen. Not only was the murder carried out under the orders of
Col. Alpirez, but the U.S. government actively assisted the
Guatemalan government in attempting to cover up the murder.86
Again, the question is asked: where does Guatemalan complicity end
and that of the U.S. begin?
To conclude, as remarkable and as praiseworthy as the ATCA
litigation has been, American courts have purposely excluded
themselves from another important class of human rights cases: those
alleging death, destruction, and suffering at the hands of the U.S.
government or its agents. Apparently to ease their doubts (or their
consciences) about what they are doing, our courts invariably claim
that they would otherwise be interfering with the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy. What this means in practice, however, is that the U.S.
government can do virtually anytghing it wants to in other countries --

' Tim Weiner, GuatemalanAgent of the C.LA. Linked to Killing ofAmerican, N.Y.
TIMEs, March 23, 1995, at A 1; Weiner, Report Faults C.IA. on Hiring ofInformers
in Guatemala,N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 1996, at A2 (reporting on the findings of a report
published by the Intelligence Oversight Board).
Tim Weiner, GuatemalaDeath Led To A Cover-Up At Top, N.Y. TMEs, Mar. 24,

1996 at Al.
' If there are limits it is only because the behavior of the United States is so
completely outrageous. Consider, for example, the statement in Committee of U.S.
Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, see supra accompanying note 71, where the court

held that if the U.S. government had enslaved our population, or that of a foreign
country, judicial interference mig!t be warranted.
In the area of extradition, the only case denying jurisdiction over a defendant
abducted in a foreign country was United States v. Toscanino, 500 F. 2d 267 (2d Cir.
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notwithstanding the human consequences that ensue from these
actions -- and not be held responsible (at least not in the U.S.) for
these actions. This smacks of hypocrisy and what it represents, quite
bluntly, is a perversion of our democratic principles.

1974). However, this was an individual who had been repeatedly tortured for
seventeen days before being brought to the United States. In a subsequent challenge,
United States v. ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F. 2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), the court held
that in order to divest itself ofjurisdiction, the conduct of U.S agents must be "of the
most outrageous and reprehensible kind" which results in the denial of due process.
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